USS Maddox (DD-731) – now escorted by USS Turner Joy (DD-951) – has resumed its DESOTO surveillance patrols along a newly proscribed route after its torpedo boat encounter two days prior. Heading away from the coast on the evening of the fourth, Maddox receives plausible intelligence of an attack order sent to three of the boats from the August 2 incident. An overcast, moonless night with visibility out to only 300 yards, the ships are entirely reliant upon their sonar and radar equipment for any impending attack.
As the destroyers approach the designated night steaming area, Maddox’s radar picks up five unidentified surface contacts (or “skunks”) about 36 miles to the northeast. Captain John J. Herrick evaluates the situation as a potential trap due to the contacts’ speeds, which vary from 28 to 40 knots. The skunks are tracked for an hour before fading from the radar, only to reappear an hour later in close formation at 13 miles east and closing at 30 knots. In the darkness, vectored aircraft are unable to identify anything. At 9:34 p.m., Turner Joy locks on to one of two new contacts that appear within a 10,000-yard perimeter and proceeds to open fire.
In the ensuing two hours, around 350 shells are fired at up to 18 other sporadic radar contacts made at varying speeds, directions, and distances. While many are evaluated to be false readings and potential repeat contacts, the crews of Maddox and Turner Joy claim that the latter definitively sunk at least two boats and severely damaged a third. Sonar readings count 22 enemy torpedoes throughout the course of action, though only the first reading is evaluated positively as being one.
At least 30 Sailors, Naval Aviators, and Marines claim some form of positive identification throughout the engagement, but no damage is made to the ships nor those aboard, and no hard evidence of an attack – such as debris or oil slicks – is located. Questions arise over whether the attack by enemy vessels had happened in the first place; the debate persists almost 60 years later.1
The controversial nature of the incident on August 4, 1964, has led to claims by interest groups from the crew aboard the ships, to Naval high command, to congressional members and historians alike. The predominant notion amongst scholars and the public today is that the attack upon USS Maddox (DD-731) and USS Turner Joy (DD-951) never took place, citing the lack of hard evidence, equipment malfunctions, and the extreme number of false contacts. Despite this, many there that night firmly maintain that an attack did take place, and that the resulting politicization of the incident would serve to damage not only the credibility and reputation of the many experienced sailors aboard the ships, but of the U.S. Navy in entirety. With few indisputable aspects of the engagement, no evidence has been exempted from scrutiny.
The signals intelligence (SIGINT) received by Maddox at 7:15 p.m. comprised of numerous reports intercepted by Marine SIGINT detachments working alongside the Army Security Agency at Phu Bai and the Naval Security Group in San Miguel, Philippines. Among the intel gathered were messages from North Vietnamese Naval Headquarters in Haiphong to three of the “Swatow” patrol (T-142 and T-146) and torpedo boats (T-333) present in the attack upon Maddox two days prior. The messages included the position of the destroyers at 1:45 p.m. and orders to prepare for an operation, with T-333’s involvement conditional upon the repair of damage sustained in the engagement on August 2. As the first incident did not specify Maddox as the target either (simply as the “enemy”), their involvement in a second attack was deemed probable.
Despite this, additional evidence has prompted significant discussion – incomplete SIGINT reports to Congress, a ships’ position report that was more than five hours old, and the highly interpretive nature of the targets add ambiguity. One alternative interpretation claims that the messages, while genuine, were in expectation of an OPLAN 34A raid that commenced that evening south of Hon Me, with the craft used for defensive patrol. Some historians suggest that the reports are more in line with the timeline and events of the August 2 attack – a notion consistent with North Vietnamese Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, who claimed thirty years later that no naval sorties were mounted on the 4th. Others attribute a combination of analytical error, political positioning, and withholding of information by the National Security Agency as making irrelevant communications support President Johnson and the Navy’s claims of a North Vietnamese threat.
Question over the accuracy of the radar and sonar equipment and the ability of the crews to operate it has persisted in the public sphere, noting the many potential causes of an incorrect reading. Obscure phenomena like the “Tonkin Gulf Ghost” or “Tonkin Spook” have become a popular attribution—a weather occurrence where a combination of temperature inversion and high humidity can appear solid on a radar scan. And while the destroyers attempted to account for such things as low-flying aircraft and self-noise from the ships’ own propellers, later evaluation of sonar readings made note of additional considerations, including excessive surface clutter from the nearly six-ft waves and “overeager” sonarmen that reported as many as 22 torpedoes. Evidence for the one torpedo evaluated as legitimate was based on the simultaneous hard-left maneuvering of the radar contact (consistent with torpedo launch sequence), sonar readings of an active torpedo, and the reported sighting of a torpedo wake from its direction by five sailors aboard Turner Joy, including the port lookout.
Visual sightings like this happened throughout the incident regarding varying subjects, with at least 15 other Sailors, Naval Aviators, and Marines making such reports. Among those of note were seven reports of a searchlight that appeared in the vicinity of a contact deemed sunk (evaluated as being a potential rescue effort or recall light for the boats) and five reports of direct sightings of the boats’ silhouettes, illuminated by star shells fired from Maddox. Reports from aircraft varied, with some like Commander George H. Edmondson and Lieutenant Jere A. Burton having seen what they evaluated as gun flashes from the water and a “snaky” wake over a mile ahead of Maddox, even claiming to have received light anti-aircraft bursts at their altitude. Others, like Commander James B. Stockdale saw “nothing but black sea and American firepower.”
The August 4th attack on USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy served as the flashpoint President Johnson needed to secure congressional approval for expanded U.S. involvement in Vietnam, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. As such, many have theorized that the event was an intentional false flag. An alternative theory gaining prominence in recent years has been put forth by Rear Admiral Lloyd “Joe” Vasey and crew members from Turner Joy, claiming that not only had the attack undoubtedly occurred, but that it may have been committed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) due to the location of the attack and President Johnson’s skeptical mention of Beijing in a letter to Soviet Premier Khrushchev regarding the incident.
Robert J. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964," Cryptological Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001.
Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
H. L. Ogier, USS Maddox Report of Tonkin Gulf Action of 4 August 1964 (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, 2015.
John Prados, "Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident" (Essay, George Washington University).
Jim Stockdale and Sybil Stockdale, In Love and War, (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1990), 23. Though a Commander at the time of the incident, Stockdale was a retired U.S. Navy Vice Admiral when the reflections in his memoir were published.
William Z. Slany, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, n.d.), Document 302. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d302.
"Gulf of Tonkin: The Record Set Straight," (2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYKgqBeLcLs/ (accessed 2/28/23), timestamp 0:42:32. 2/28/2023.
"Gulf of Tonkin Revisited: Did China Attack the U.S?," (2017), https://thinktechhawaii.com/gulf-of-tonkin-revisited-did-china-attack-the-u-s/ (accessed 2/28/23), timestamp 0:30:09. 2/28/2023.
Lloyd R. Vasey, "Tonkin: Setting the Record Straight," August 2010, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010/august/tonkin-setting-record-straight (accessed 2/28/2023).
Tonkin Gulf Collection, 1962-1984 [1964 and 1968], Series I: Misc. Subject Files, 1964, Box 1 of 12, Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC.