Studies and Observations Group

MACV establishes the Special Operations Group, which is later renamed the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). SOG is a joint-service U.S. special operations unit that conducts unconventional warfare—mainly against the Ho Chi Minh Trail and in North Vietnam—in support of a new allied covert action program called Operation Plan 34A. SOG’s missions include strategic reconnaissance, capturing enemy prisoners, rescuing downed aircrews, and conducting clandestine and psychological warfare. At peak strength, SOG consists of about 2,500 American and 7,000 Southeast Asian personnel.1

During the Cold War, President Kennedy recognized that the United States needed to develop a new “flexible response” capability—in which small specially trained units could conduct operations where conventional forces were unable to go—to clandestinely fight in the Cold War’s multiple “hot wars” emerging throughout the world. At first, the CIA headed these efforts, but after the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, Kennedy ordered the military service branches to develop ways of conducting unconventional warfare, of which SOG was one result.

Most military historians hold that SOG performed effectively during the Vietnam War. These authors argue SOG’s tactics were much more appropriate for the Vietnam War than the large-scale, conventional operations preferred by Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams. Contrary to press reports that mischaracterized SOG units as operating without political oversight, scholars have found that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations carefully controlled and monitored these units and their missions; in fact, some historians assert that the generals and admirals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt threatened by the expansion of the use of unconventional warfare. Scholars note that military leaders reduced funding for unconventional warfare following the Vietnam War, when service in the special forces often became a hindrance for career advancement for American servicemen. Because small groups of highly trained and motivated soldiers cannot deliver victory in war by themselves and special operations works best as a supplement to conventional military operations, military historians usually concede that more clandestine missions would not have achieved a U.S. victory in the Vietnam War.

Some SOG missions failed spectacularly. During the war, SOG operatives inserted as many as 500 undercover agents into North Vietnam. North Vietnamese agents captured, killed, or turned into double agents nearly all of these spies. Still, despite the setbacks, SOG’s performance in Vietnam helped win special forces and unconventional warfare an integral place within the United States military’s structure and doctrine.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

Plaster, John. SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997.

Schutz, Richard H. The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.