President Johnson Authorizes the Bombing of North Vietnam

February 13, 1965

F-105Ds refueling en route to North Vietnam in 1965

In the immediate wake of the Viet Cong attack at Pleiku, President Johnson reads a report submitted by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy regarding Bundy’s recent trip to South Vietnam. Bundy’s report notes that “without U.S. action defeat appears inevitable.”

Johnson decides to authorize the systematic bombing of North Vietnam in an attempt to prop up the Saigon regime and deter Hanoi’s support for Viet Cong insurgents. Initial retaliatory bombings eventually develop into the years-long bombing operation called ROLLING THUNDER. Johnson is publically silent about his decision to authorize the bombings.1

¹Robert Dallek, “Fear, Ambition, and Politics,” in McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 174–177; Fredrik Logevall, “Choosing War,” in McMahon, ed., Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War, 194; Robert Buzzanco, “The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam During the Johnson Years,” in Young and Buzzanco, eds., A Companion to the Vietnam War, 174–197; Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 60–63, 112; Jeffrey W. Helsing, Johnson’s War/Johnson’s Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 9; Fredrik Logevall, “‘There Ain’t No Daylight’: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Escalation” in Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 98–99.

What Historians Say: The president’s decision to escalate the war by bombing North Vietnam marks a crucial turning point in U.S. involvement in Vietnam. One of the more controversial aspects of Johnson’s decisions for escalation in early 1965 is that he chooses to keep the details of his actions from the public. Arguments for why he does so usually note that Johnson believes announcing an escalation of the war would endanger his ambitious domestic agenda—including Great Society and civil rights legislation—and would allow his political opponents to distract Congress from his reform plans. Johnson, historians assert, hopes to avoid the public perception that the United States is embarking on a wider war, which might convince lawmakers and their constituents that they cannot afford to enact his proposed domestic policies.

Buzzanco, Robert. “The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam During the Johnson Years,” in Marilyn B. Young, and Robert Buzzanco, eds. A Companion to the Vietnam War. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.

Dallek, Robert. “Fear, Ambition, and Politics,” in Robert J. McMahon, ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2008.

Helsing, Jeffrey W. Johnson’s War/Johnson’s Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.

Logevall, Fredrik. “Choosing War,” in in Robert J. McMahon, ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2008.

Logevall, Fredrik “‘There Ain’t No Daylight’: Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Escalation” in Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

VanDeMark, Brian. Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.